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Abstract. Single photon detectors (SPDs) based on passively quenched
avalanche photodiodes can be temporarily blinded by relatively bright light, of
intensity less than 1 nW. A bright-light regime suitable for attacking a quantum
key distribution system containing such detectors is described in this paper. In
this regime, all SPDs in the receiver Bob are uniformly blinded by continuous
illumination coming from the eavesdropper Eve. When Eve needs a certain
detector in Bob to produce a click, she modifies the polarization (or other
parameters used to encode quantum states) of the light she sends to Bob such
that the target detector stops receiving light, while the other detector(s) continue
to be illuminated. The target detector regains single photon sensitivity and, when
Eve modifies the polarization again, produces a single click. Thus, Eve has
full control of Bob and can perform a successful intercept–resend attack. To
check the feasibility of the attack, three different models of passively quenched
detectors have been tested. In the experiment, I have simulated the intensity
diagrams the detectors would receive in a real QKD system under attack. Control
parameters and side effects are considered. It appears that the attack could be
practically possible.
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1. Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a technique that allows remote parties to grow shared secret
random key material at a steady rate, using an insecure optical communication channel and
an authenticated classical communication channel [1, 2]. From a tabletop demonstration 19
years ago [1], QKD has progressed to commercial devices working over tens of kilometers of
optical fiber1 and many long-distance experiments. Key transmission over more than 100 km of
fiber [3, 4] and 23 and 144 km of free space [5]–[7] has been demonstrated. As QKD enters the
commercial market, it becomes increasingly important to verify the actual level of security in
its implementations, and search for possible loopholes.
QKD has been proved to be unconditionally secure for certain models of equipment
that include most common imperfections of components [8]. However, it remains a challenge
to build a system that is demonstrably in strict accordance with the model in the security
proof. Discovering and patching loopholes and imperfections of components is an ongoing
process [9]–[13]. Once found, such an imperfection affecting security can either be integrated
into the unconditional proof, neutralized by a specific coutermeasure or avoided through a
rational choice of components, optical scheme and QKD protocol.
When treating security of QKD, we follow Kerckhoffs’ principle: ‘The system must
not be required to be secret, and it must be able to fall into enemy hands without causing
inconvenience’ [14]. This principle, embraced in classical cryptography since the nineteenth
century, means Eve is assumed to know everything about Alice’s and Bob’s equipment. Thus,
Eve can fully exploit every imperfection that exists in the legitimate parties’ hardware and
software. Although it is tempting to assume that Eve might not know the type of equipment
or its exact parameters, the history of cryptography shows that she will eventually find this
out. In QKD, practical ways of measuring unobtrusively equipment parameters of a running
cryptosystem may exist as well [11].
1 Commercial QKD systems are available, as of early 2009, from at least three companies: id Quantique
(Switzerland), http://www.idquantique.com/; MagiQ Technologies (USA), http://www.magiqtech.com/;
SmartQuantum (France), http://www.smartquantum.com/
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Figure 1. Detector saturation curves. Model 1: do-it-yourself design by
Kurtsiefer et al (currently used in several laboratories; the sample tested was
assembled at the Laboratory of Spontaneous Parametric Down-Conversion
at Moscow State University). Model 2: EG&G SPCM-200-PQ (industrially
produced in the 1990s). Model 3: four detectors used in Bob in a daylight free-
space QKD system [17] (entire Bob is pictured in the inset; curves for model
3 reprinted from [18]). The dark count rate is around 100 counts per second
(cps) for model 1, around 50 cps for model 2, and in the 900–2100 cps range for
model 3.
In this paper, I report an imperfection found in single photon detectors (SPDs) of one
particular type, namely those based on passively quenched avalanche photodiodes (APDs). This
particular type of SPD is probably used in about 10% of all QKD implementations reported to
date. Since the passive quenching is most suited for silicon APDs, the majority of the possibly
affected systems are free-space QKD experiments doing optical transmission in the 500–900 nm
wavelength range; they are listed in section 5. The current commercial devices working at longer
telecommunication wavelengths1 are not affected by this paticular vulnerability, because they
use another type of SPD, a gated APD.
2. Blinding and controlling a passively quenched SPD
Passive quenching is the oldest and simplest possible circuit design in SPDs based on APDs
[15, 16]. Beyond the useful photon counting rate range, passively quenched SPDs exhibit
saturation and blinding behavior. Figure 1 illustrates this with the example of three different
SPD models that I have tested. Up to a certain point different for each SPD model, their count
rate increases approximately linearly with intensity of CW illumination. At higher input light
intensities, the count rate saturates, reaches the peak value different for each model and begins
to drop. It drops to exactly zero at 10 pW input power (at 820 nm wavelength) for model 1, at
280 pW (at 780 nm) for model 2 and at intermediate power values for the four tested detectors
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4Figure 2. Detector model 1: (a) equivalent circuit diagram, (b) current through
the APD and voltage at the APD during an avalanche and subsequent recharge.
of model 3. The shapes of the saturation curves are similar for all the tested detector models.
This suggests that the saturation and blinding is generic to the passively quenched detector
design. For the rest of this paper (except section 4.2), characteristics of model 1 are given in all
examples, while models 2 and 3 are implied to exhibit the same behavior with different values
of parameters.
To explain the blinding behavior, let us consider the circuit diagram of the detector
model 1 (figure 2). The Si APD (PerkinElmer C30902S) is biased 6–10 V above its breakdown
voltage from a high-voltage source via a 360 k resistor. The circuit works thanks to the
presence of two stray capacitances of the order of 1 pF each, shown in the circuit diagram. When
there is no current flowing through the APD, both capacitances are charged to the bias voltage.
During an avalanche, they quickly discharge through the APD, producing a short current pulse.
The discharge current of the leftmost capacitance is converted into voltage at a 100 resistor,
and this voltage is sensed by a fast ECL comparator (MC100EL16). The short output pulse
of the comparator is widened to about 10µs by a non-retriggerable monostable multivibrator.
The current pulse produced during the avalanche is of the order of 1 ns wide. When the voltage
at the APD drops sufficiently close to the breakdown voltage, the avalanche quenches. The
capacitances are subsequently slowly recharged through the bias resistor, with a recharge time
constant of the order of 1µs.
Until the capacitances recharge to a certain threshold voltage, which in our detector sample
takes about 1µs, the detector has no single photon sensitivity. (After 1µs, it increases its
quantum efficiency gradually as the voltage continues to rise.) However, a photon coming during
the first microsecond may still cause an avalanche with a smaller peak current, not reaching the
comparator threshold [16]. Such small avalanches reset the voltage and can keep the detector
blinded indefinitely if they occur often enough. This is the primary blinding mechanism in
the passively quenched detectors. Additionally, heating of the APD chip can contribute to the
blinding. At 10 pW input optical power, the average electrical power dissipated in the APD
is measured to be 5.7 mW. PerkinElmer C30902S APD is reported to have a high thermal
resistance between the chip and the package [19]. The measured electrical power may raise
the chip temperature by several degrees. This rise in temperature would increase the breakdown
voltage by several volts, which could be a contributing factor to the blinding.
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5Figure 3. Control diagrams for detector model 1: (a) input intensity diagram that
keeps the detector completely blinded at all times (no output pulses); (b) input
intensity diagram that produces a single output pulse with probability greater
than 0.8, right after the end of the 2µs gap. The actual input intensity on both
diagrams may take any shape within the hatched area.
In applications of SPDs, the nonlinearity of the response is undesirable [16]. Typically a
detector is considered usable only in the mostly linear portion of its characteristic, located to the
left of the saturation peak in figure 1. Detectors are never used beyond their saturation point. The
following might be the first ‘useful application’ I have found for the beyond-saturation regime.
In doing an attack against a QKD system, Eve may blind Bob’s SPDs by delivering constant
illumination higher than 10 pW to each of them. However, by introducing a gap in which the
intensity of illumination drops to zero at one of Bob’s SPDs, she may induce an output pulse at
that SPD.
Let us first consider how Eve can control a single SPD. Experimental tests made on the
detector model 1 have demonstrated that the control diagrams shown in figure 3 can be used.
When the power of input illumination Popt stays within the range depicted in figure 3(a), the
SPD is kept blinded. However, in figure 3(b), after the light is switched off, the capacitances
in the SPD have time to recharge and it becomes sensitive to single photons. When the light is
switched on 2µs later, the SPD produces a single photon count with probability greater than
0.8 (or no click in the remaining fraction of the cases), and after that becomes blinded again. I
have only tested power values up to 400 pW with this detector model; however, the upper border
of the power range could probably be extended much higher than 400 pW without causing any
new effects. Experimental tests of the detectors are treated in more detail later on, in section 4.
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63. Proposed attack against the QKD system
With the detector control method described above, Eve can attack a complete QKD system.
In a QKD system, Bob has several detectors and/or makes a choice of detection basis. Eve
needs a way to cause a click in a specific detector in a specific basis of her choice, without
causing a click in the other detector(s) or in a different basis. I initially explain the attack
with the example of a system with polarization coding and active basis choice at Bob that
runs the Bennett–Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol [1, 20]. In such a system, input light at Bob
first passes through a modulator that, at Bob’s random choice, either does nothing or rotates
any input polarization state 45◦ clockwise, thus setting one of the two possible detection bases
(figure 4(a)). After the modulator, light is split at a polarizing beam splitter (PBS). The vertical
component of polarization goes to the detector D0 and the horizontal component goes to the
detector D1.
Eve runs an intercept–resend attack (faked-state attack [11]) against this system. In the
faked-state attack, she blocks the light between Alice and Bob completely (figure 4(b)). Eve
uses a replica of Bob’s setup Bob′ to detect Alice’s quantum state, choosing the detection
basis at random. Then, Eve forces Bob to make a click in her basis only and with the same
bit value as she has just detected. (This is the difference between the conventional intercept–
resend attack [1] and the faked-state attack [11]: in the latter, the basis and bit value of Bob’s
detector click is always the same as Eve’s, thus the attack does not cause errors in the sifted key
and eavesdropping is not detected.) Eve forces a click in the selected basis with the specific bit
value by sending to Bob a specially crafted light state called a faked state, using her faked state
generator FS. The faked state exploits technological imperfections in Bob to achieve its goal. In
the present study, it will exploit detector controllability.
Let us suppose for certainty that Eve has detected Alice’s quantum state in the 0◦ basis and
registered a click in her D0 detector. She now has to form and send to Bob a faked state. The
faked state should cause a click in Bob’s D0 detector in the case that Bob chooses the 0◦ basis
(the same basis as Eve has used), and should cause no clicks in either of Bob’s detectors in the
case that Bob chooses the 45◦ basis (not the basis Eve has used). The faked state that reaches this
goal consists of an incoherent mixture of vertical and horizontal polarization components, with
an intensity diagram for each polarization component as shown in the upper half of figure 4(c).
The lower half of figure 4(c) shows what happens to this faked state in Bob’s setup. If Bob
chooses the 0◦ basis, his modulator does nothing and the two polarization components of the
faked state are split each to its own detector. The intensity diagram of the vertical polarization
component causes a click in D0 with probability greater than 0.8 (for the gap width of 2µs).
The intensity diagram of the horizontal polarization component keeps D1 blinded. If Bob,
however, chooses the 45◦ basis, each polarization component is rotated 45◦ and is split equally
at the polarizing beam splitter. The halves of the two polarization components sum at each
detector, resulting in identical intensity diagrams that keep both detectors blinded. Eve’s three
other possible bit-basis detection results are treated symmetrically. Thus, my faked-state attack
succeeds.
The reader may notice that the probability of a faked state sent by Eve to cause a click
at Bob is 0.82 = 0.4. Many realistic Bobs have an overall photon detection efficiency of less
than 40%, mainly due to limited quantum efficiency of the APDs. For these Bobs, Eve can
mimic their detection rate before the attack, provided she uses ideal SPDs with 100% quantum
efficiency and zero-loss optics in Bob′. However, I want my attack to be not only possible in
principle, but also implementable in practice, today. For that, Eve cannot use non-existent ideal
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7Figure 4. Proposed attack against a QKD system that uses two model 1 detectors:
(a) equivalent optical scheme of Bob’s setup; (b) scheme of the faked-state
attack; (c) faked state sent by Eve in the case of her detection in the 0◦ basis
with the result D0, and the intensity diagrams that result at Bob’s detectors for
his two possible basis choices. Optical losses in components are neglected; in the
presence of losses, Eve should send a proportionally brighter faked state.
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8detectors. It would also be impractical for her to use exotic high-quantum-efficiency detectors
working at cryogenic temperatures. Most practical for Eve would be to use a copy of Bob’s
actual setup for her Bob′, maybe with limited improvements. In this situation, Bob will observe
loss of detection efficiency under attack, which equivalently appears to him as a sudden 4 dB
additional loss in the line, and may trigger a security alarm. However, this would be a solvable
problem for Eve in most of the real situations, because loss in the transmission line between
Alice and Bob almost always exceeds 4 dB. Eve may place her detection unit closer to Alice.
Thus, she excludes the loss in the length of the line between her detection unit and Bob. This
compensates for the reduced ‘detection efficiency’ of her faked states at Bob. Eve could also
try to improve the quantum efficiency of her detectors and reduce losses in Bob′ compared to
those of Bob’s setup. In free-space QKD, the losses Eve could try to reduce would include the
coupling loss from Alice’s free-space beam into the receiver telescope.
My attack is applicable to different protocols and schemes, when they use vulnerable
detectors. The attack clearly applies to schemes with passive basis choice at Bob [5]–[7], [17],
[21]–[30]. For these schemes, Eve should double the intensity of her faked states. The random
basis choice by Bob is removed: Eve always gets to choose the basis for him. In the case of the
BB84 protocol, the four cells in the table in figure 4(c) represent the intensity diagrams at Bob’s
four detectors. This is the case described in the abstract of this paper.
Besides polarization, another coding widely used in QKD is phase coding [31, 32]. If
a scheme with phase coding employs vulnerable detectors, this attack can be run against it.
For phase coding Eve shall, instead of the polarization components shown in figure 4(c),
use components of faked state with 0 and pi phase differences between the arms of the
interferometer. The attack will also work on systems using the Scarani–Acin–Ribordy–Gisin
2004 (SARG04) protocol [33] and most of the decoy-state protocols [4, 5, 34, 35], as long as
Bob is using passively quenched detectors. The decoy-state protocols referenced above do not
help the legitimate users against this attack, because Eve does not measure photon number. She
detects Alice’s states with a faithful replica of Bob’s setup and then simply forces her detection
results onto Bob as transparently as she can. Finally, this attack is also applicable to the Bennett
1992 (B92) protocol [31], [36]–[42], to the Ekert protocol [43, 44], to the six-state protocol [45]
and, under certain conditions, to secret sharing schemes [46].
For a practical implementation of the attack, it is important to consider all side effects
it causes, and how to mask them so that Alice and Bob are not alarmed. One side effect, the
less-than-unity ‘detection efficiency’ of the faked states at Bob, has been discussed above.
Another side effect is the replacement of dark counts of Bob’s detectors with dark counts of
Eve’s detectors. During the attack, Eve keeps Bob’s detectors blinded when she is not sending
faked states. Thus, they do not produce spontaneous counts. Instead, Eve has dark counts in her
detectors and she cannot distinguish these from Alice’s photons. She passes them on to Bob as
faked states. Eve’s detectors may have a lower ratio of dark counts to photon counts than Bob’s.
Eve is certainly allowed to achieve this in practice, either by using better detectors or by placing
them closer to Alice (which she may have to do anyway). This may cause an overall reduction
in the quantum bit error rate (QBER) experienced by Alice and Bob, and be noticed by them. If
this becomes a problem, Eve can emulate additional dark counts by sending random faked states
to Bob at random times. Similarly, optical imperfections at Bob that originally contributed to
the QBER get replaced by the optical imperfections in Eve’s copy of Bob’s setup. (However,
the optical imperfections at Bob may still make some contribution to the QBER through timing
side effects during the attack, as will be shown in the next section.)
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9Side effects may arise when Eve begins and ends the attack. When she goes into the control
mode by switching on the constant illumination, Bob’s detectors will each produce a single
click. These initial clicks at the beginning of the attack may register as one or more error bits in
the key. However, this should not be a problem as long as Eve does not switch in and out of the
attack mode too frequently. At the end of the attack, when Eve switches off the illumination,
no extra clicks are produced except for, maybe, afterpulses with slightly increased probability
than normal. Thus, at least in principle, Eve can begin and end this attack on a running quantum
cryptolink.
Another side effect is the additional delay in the quantum channel caused by Eve. The
major component of this delay is the gap width in the faked state. Eve begins forming the faked
state immediately after detecting Alice’s quantum state. However, the actual click at Bob occurs
at the end of the gap, which comes 2µs later. Thankfully, the time on Alice’s and Bob’s clocks
is not authenticated in the QKD protocol. Many of the possibly affected QKD systems (listed
in section 5) measure the time difference by the time of arrival of quantum states to Bob. In
these systems, the additional 2µs delay will easily be absorbed by the time synchronization
algorithm. In case the delay ever becomes a problem for Eve, she may try a slightly different
tactic. Eve could begin sending to Bob a faked state for a particular bit-basis combination
before she actually detects it. Then, when she detects Alice’s quantum state in this bit-basis
combination, she instantly ends the gap and finishes the faked state. As will be shown in the
next section, the gap in the faked state can be of variable width, so this tactic might work.
Finally, Eve must take into account two practical limitations of the hardware. One
limitation is a finite extinction ratio of Bob’s PBS, as well as Eve’s finite precision in forming
polarized light with exact parameters of polarization. The resulting imperfect splitting of the two
faked state components at Bob’s PBS leads to nonzero optical power in the gap on the control
intensity diagram of the target detector. Another limitation is the time distribution of detector
counts induced immediately after the end of the gap. This time distributon has a non-negligible
width. These two limitations and their effects on the attack are considered in the next section.
4. Detector tests
In this section, I mainly consider time distribution of clicks induced by faked states. Many
of the possibly affected QKD systems register the timing of detector output pulses with sub-
nanosecond precision. The width of Bob’s time bin in which clicks are accepted as belonging
to a particular Alice’s qubit can be of the order of 1 ns. Ideally, Eve’s faked state should induce
a click with sub-nanosecond time precision, to target the qubit time bin. However, as the tests
show, the actual time distribution of the induced clicks is much wider.
The experimental tests of three different detector models are reported below.
4.1. Detector model 1
This detector model is based on a solder-it-yourself printed circuit board developed by
Kurtsiefer et al. Being a low-cost, simple and compact design, it is used in several laboratories
around the world. The equivalent diagram of the signal part of the circuit is shown in figure 2(a).
The particular sample I have tested features a multivibrator pulse duration of about 10µs, while
it is usually made orders of magnitude shorter in this circuit.
New Journal of Physics 11 (2009) 065003 (http://www.njp.org/)
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Figure 5. Detector model 1: control intensity diagram during testing. It was
applied at 1 kHz repetition rate.
Figure 6. Detector model 1: time distributions of pulse’s leading edge at
the detector output, when Eve controls it by constant illumination with an
approximately 2µs wide gap: (a) time distributions for zero and nonzero Popt. low
(at Popt. high = 13 pW); (b) time distributions in the main response peak for a
range of Popt. high values (at Popt. low = 0). On the charts, t = 0 approximately
corresponds to the start of the gap in illumination; the main response peak begins
just after the end of the gap.
The detector has been tested under an input illumination time diagram shown in figure 5.
Laser illumination at 820 nm wavelength was applied uniformly over the entire photosensitive
area of the APD 0.5 mm in diameter2. The optical power values Popt are calculated as the total
power impinging on the photosensitive area. I have tested the detector at both zero and nonzero
power levels in the gap Popt. low.
Figure 6(a) shows a typical time distribution of the SPD output pulses and what effects the
nonzero power in the gap has on this time distribution. During approximately the first 1µs of
the gap, the SPD does not produce output pulses at all. After 1µs, some premature output pulses
appear. When there is no illumination in the gap (Popt. low = 0), the average rate of these pulses
is, at the parameters for which the chart is plotted, between three and four times the normal dark
count rate (of about 100 cps). After the end of the gap, there is a major response peak of a certain
width. Nonzero illumination in the gap causes two effects. Firstly, the probability of premature
2 A detailed description of the testing setup can be found in the first version of this paper, arXiv:0707.3987v1
[quant-ph].
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output pulses greatly increases, as can be seen on the Popt. low = 0.2 pW curve. Secondly, the
probability of output pulses in the main response peak decreases.
The width of the main response peak can be reduced by increasing Popt. high, as shown in
figure 6(b). 5 ns full-width at half-maximum (FWHM), or 10 ns width as measured near the
base of the peak at the 2% magnitude level, has been achieved at Popt. high = 400 pW. The width
could likely be decreased further at higher levels of Popt. high; however, I did not test beyond
400 pW with this detector model. The detector response in the main peak is a single-photon
click, as suggested by the exponentially decaying tail of the time distribution and by an estimate
of the number of photons impinging on the APD in a unit of time. It is possible that multi-
photon effects influence the time distribution at higher levels of Popt. high; however, there was no
practical way of testing this. I have not investigated which effect is responsible for the gradual
rising edge of the main response peak in this test.
As you see, the total width of the time distribution, including the premature clicks, is more
than 1µs. The practical significance of this wide time distribution varies a lot depending on
how Bob treats clicks falling outside his qubit time bin (which is always much narrower than
1µs). If all or most of these clicks are simply disregarded by him, this is not much of a problem
for Eve. In this case, she only faces an additional reduction in the ‘detection efficiency’ of
her faked states at Bob, which could be compensated as discussed in the previous section. If,
however, clicks registered by Bob outside the proper qubit time bin contribute to the QBER
(by falling into adjacent qubit time bins) or trigger an alarm condition, then Eve faces more
stringent requirements. How these clicks are actually treated depends on implementation details
and algorithms in each particular QKD system under attack, which I do not consider here. The
relevant implementation details are usually not reported in papers to the required extent, so
experimenting with each QKD system will be necessary.
We can still estimate how bad this problem can be by considering one of the worst possible
cases for Eve. While the width of the main response peak can be reduced by increasing Popt. high,
the premature counts in the gap are always distributed over a wide time span. I assume that
all these premature counts fall into wrong qubit time bins at Bob. This can happen in a high-
speed QKD system with qubit time bins following each other with no gaps between them, and
passive basis choice at Bob. In the BB84 protocol, a count falling into a wrong qubit bin has
25% chance of causing an error in the sifted key (a combination of 50% chance of being in
a compatible basis and 50% chance of having a wrong bit value). At the same time, I assume
that all counts in the main peak fall into the proper time bin and register as error-free key bits.
To avoid being discovered, Eve needs to maintain the QBER at approximately the same level
as before her attack. The premature counts are caused by nonzero optical power in the gap,
which is caused in part by imperfect optical alignment between Eve and Bob. To estimate the
required quality of optical alignment, I have measured time distributions at several values of
Popt. low (at Popt. high = 13 pW and gap width of 2µs). From the obtained data, I have calculated
the probability ratio of having a premature click to having a click in the main response peak,
for each used value of Popt. low. The measurement has shown that this probability ratio rises
approximately linearly with Popt. low. If we additionally assume that this effect is the main
contribution to the QBER and that Eve uses the intensity diagrams with power levels as given
in figure 4(c), then the measurement data suggest
QBER ≈ 4.2
re
, (1)
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Figure 7. Detector model 1: Eve’s probability of producing a pulse at the detector
output versus width of the gap in illumination (at Popt. low = 0).
where re is an extinction ratio between Bob’s two detectors in the target basis achieved by Eve.
Thus, to match values of the QBER in the 2–5% range typically observed in QKD systems,
Eve may need to achieve re in the 19–23 dB range (or higher if other sources of errors are
significant). This would be possible if the native extinction ratio of Bob’s PBS exceeds re; this
depends on the type of PBS used. Then, Eve would face a rather strong but probably realistic
requirement on the precision of her polarization alignment. To narrow down the assumptions
made in this assessment one would need to analyze and attack a concrete QKD implementation.
This could be a task for the future.
Finally, figure 7 shows how the probability of inducing the output pulse depends on the gap
width. I have chosen the gap width of 2µs for all the other measurements with this detector, to
achieve the count probability reasonably close to 1 without making the gap unnecessarily wide.
As you can see, the count probability for a 2µs or wider gap almost does not depend on Popt.high.
Interestingly, although the count probability exceeds 0.99 at gap widths larger than 5µs, it never
becomes exactly 1.
In these measurements, the gap repetition rate was 1 kHz. However, I have verified that, if
necessary, the gap repetition rate can be increased to the limit. When the gaps follow each other
in close succession (with less than 2µs between them), they still cause clicks at the SPD output.
4.2. Detector model 2
This detector model is SPCM-200-PQ, industrially produced by EG&G in the 1990s. While
testing this model, I have focused on reducing the width of the main response peak. To achieve
this goal, an improved control intensity diagram, shown in figure 8, has been used. A 780 nm
illumination formed by mixing signals from two semiconductor lasers was applied uniformly
over the entire photosensitive area of the APD 0.15–0.2 mm in diameter. The optical power at the
APD is kept at the minimum blinding level Pblind = 280 pW most of the time. In the beginning
of the gap, a short brighter pulse A is applied. The purpose of this pulse is to discharge the
capacitances in the SPD to about the same level every time in the beginning of the gap. Then the
recharging process always starts at the same voltage and time, which leads to a certain voltage
being applied to the APD at the end of the gap. If the pulse A is absent, the recharge process
New Journal of Physics 11 (2009) 065003 (http://www.njp.org/)
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Figure 8. Detector model 2: control intensity diagram during testing. It was
applied at 10 kHz repetition rate.
starts at a random time of the last occurrence of avalanche before the gap. In this case, the
APD voltage at the end of the gap varies, which leads to increased jitter in the single photon
response [16]. The gap ends with another brighter pulse B, which guarantees the arrival of the
first few photons at the APD within a very short time. To fulfill this purpose, the pulse B does
not have to be long. However, the tested detector sample tended to produce double output pulses
when Pblind was applied near the end of its first output pulse. Extending the length of the bright
pulse B to 200 ns reduced the probability of another output pulse appearing after the first one
from 8 to 0.5%. In the 500 ns wide gap, illumination at the power level 34 dB below Pblind was
applied to the detector, to simulate imperfect polarization splitting at Bob’s PBS.
The resulting time distribution of the SPD output pulses is shown in figure 9. At 0.22µW
peak power in the optical pulses A and B, the main response peak on the time distribution is
0.92 ns wide. The familiar premature counts in the gap are present on this time distribution,
as well as delayed counts after the main peak. The latter can probably be attributed to small
avalanches occurring early in the gap, resulting in delayed detector response after the end of the
gap. The total probability, including the premature and delayed counts, of the detector producing
a click in response to the control diagram is very close to 1.
The presence of both brighter optical pulses A and B on the control diagram is necessary to
achieve the narrowest width of the main response peak. Figure 10 shows how the width depends
on the presence of each of these pulses and on the peak power in them.
4.3. Detector model 3
This detector model is used in a compact passive polarization analyzer module in Bob in
a daylight free-space QKD system [17]. The system has been developed at the Centre for
Quantum Technologies in Singapore. We have tested all four detector channels. Unlike the
previous two experiments, in this one we did not have physical access to measure absolute
power impinging on the APDs. The saturation curves for model 3 in figure 1 are scaled based
on a guess that the detector quantum efficiency in the linear part of the curves was around 50%.
On this QKD system, Q Liu and I have demonstrated that the Bob control method proposed
in section 3 works and that the detectors are individually addressable with sub-nanosecond jitter.
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Figure 9. Detector model 2: time distribution of pulse’s leading edge at the
detector output, when Eve controls it by an intensity diagram in which both parts
A and B are present, at P+ = 784Pblind = 0.22µW.
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Figure 10. Detector model 2: width of the main response peak versus excess
optical power P+ in the parts A and B of the control intensity diagram. Three
cases are charted: only part A is present on the control diagram (while B is
not), only part B is present (while A is not), and both parts A and B are present
simultaneously. Note that the leftmost point on the ‘only A’ curve corresponds to
roughly the same shape of the control diagram as was used for testing the detector
model 1: a gap in constant illumination at the minimum blinding intensity.
We used polarization faked states that resulted in a control intensity diagram at the APDs similar
to the one in figure 8. This will be reported in a separate paper [18].
From the experiments reported above, it appears that Eve might in practice be able to control
passively quenched detectors well enough to attack a real QKD system.
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5. Possibly affected systems and countermeasures
Currently, there are at least 28 papers reporting different QKD experiments that employ non-
gated Si APDs. The breakdown of these papers is as follows. Eight of them reported the use
of passively quenched APDs [5, 17, 22, 25, 29, 44, 47, 48], ten reported the use of non-gated,
actively quenched APDs [26, 30, 36, 37], [39]–[42], [49, 50], and another ten did not specify
the type of quenching, only saying that Si APDs or ‘detectors’ (which I assume were Si APDs)
were used [6, 7, 21, 23, 24, 27, 28, 38, 51, 52]. I have since learned that three of the latter ten
experiments [6, 7, 28] did in fact use passively quenched detectors of a design very similar to
the models 1 and 3 studied in this paper. Thus, it appears that passively quenched and actively
quenched Si APDs are equally frequently used in QKD experiments. I remark that at least one
model of actively quenched Si SPD has been shown to be vulnerable to a somewhat similar
attack also involving bright illumination [13].
Continued frequent use of passive quenching can be explained by its practical properties.
It is well known that an actively quenched APD delivers superior count rate and timing
characteristics [16, 53]. However, a passively quenched circuit is simpler, cheaper and more
versatile; the biasing parameters are easy to adjust; a larger photosensitive area APD can
be used than those embedded in commercially available actively quenched detector modules.
At the same time, the performance of the passively quenched SPD is often adequate for the task.
For example, in the 144 km QKD experiments [5, 6], laboratory-made passively quenched
detectors were used because the average count rate at Bob was low [54].
Unfortunately, none of the 28 experiments in my sampling of the literature seemed to
implement any countermeasure against bright-light attacks (with the possible exception of [37]
where Eve’s illumination might accidentally cause Bob’s separate timing detector to work
incorrectly). Nor do I know of any SPD module with a specified guaranteed behavior under
bright-light illumination or equipped with an extra output that signals saturation or blinding.
It may appear that introducing authenticated timing into the QKD protocol can prevent my
attack. However, Eve can try a slightly different tactic discussed in section 3, by starting to form
a faked state before the actual detection occurs in Bob′. This tactic may in practice allow her to
mimic the timing of Bob’s clicks with just a few ns extra delay. Additionally, when the QKD
system uses an optical fiber [25], Eve can gain time by routing her classical communication
from Bob′ to the FS (see figure 4(b)) via a radio link in which signals propagate faster than in
the fiber. Authenticated timing does not prevent the detector controllability, and thus is not a
complete solution.
Other researchers have proposed to equip each SPD with a ‘detector ready’ signal that is
only present when the voltage at the APD guarantees certain minimum quantum efficiency [55].
I think this is a promising idea. These ‘detector ready’ signals from all of Bob’s SPDs can
be combined on an AND-gate and used to disable/enable click recording from all SPDs
simultaneously by Bob’s electronic registration system. Besides preventing the bright-light
attacks, this would also be useful to thwart subtler exploits. This circuit introduces registration
blanking time for all detectors simultaneously whenever at least one of them is insensitive to
photons after an avalanche. Rejecting clicks that occur whenever at least one detector is having
a deadtime seems to be a necessary security measure in any QKD system [55]. Additionally,
this photon registration system can guarantee a certain quantified minimum quantum efficiency
of each detector whenever the system is recording clicks. This guarantee may be required by a
general security proof that takes into account equipment imperfections [56].
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Once a hack-proofed system is built, it would have to be tested thoroughly under bright-
light illumination with various temporal diagrams over a wide input intensity range. Ideally, the
testing should include higher input power levels up to and above the damage threshold of Bob’s
optics.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, I have shown how the saturation and blinding behavior of the passively quenched
APD can be used to gain control over detectors and stage an attack against a QKD system.
Passively quenched detectors of three different models have been experimentally tested and
their control demonstrated by the same method, under realistic conditions. It would now be
interesting to demonstrate a complete attack against a running QKD system.
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